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Abstract
In outsourced database (ODB) systems the database owner publishes its data through a
number of remote servers, with the goal of enabling clients at the edge of the network to access
and query the data more efficiently. As servers might be untrusted or can be compromised,
query authentication becomes an essential component of ODB systems. Existing solutions for
this problem concentrate mostly on static scenarios and are based on idealistic properties for
certain cryptographic primitives. In this work, first we define a variety of essential and prac-
tical cost metrics associated with ODB systems. Then, we analytically evaluate a number of
different approaches, in search for a solution that best leverages all metrics. Most importantly,
we look at solutions that can handle dynamic scenarios, where owners periodically update the
data residing at the servers. Finally, we discuss query freshness, a new dimension in data au-
thentication that has not been explored before. A comprehensive experimental evaluation of
the proposed and existing approaches is used to validate the analytical models and verify our
claims. Our findings exhibit that the proposed solutions improve performance substantially
over existing approaches, both for static and dynamic environments.
1 Introduction
Database outsourcing [13] is a new paradigm that has been proposed recently and received con-
siderable attention. The basic idea is that data owners delegate their database needs and func-
tionalities to a third-party that provides services to the users of the database. Since the third
party can be untrusted or can be compromised, security concerns must be addressed before this
delegation.
There are three main entities in the Outsourced Database (ODB) model: the data owner,
the database service provider (a.k.a. server) and the client. In general, many instances of each
entity may exist. In practice, usually there is a single or a few data owners, a few servers, and
many clients. The data owner first creates the database, along with the associated index and
authentication structures and uploads it to the servers. It is assumed that the data owner may
update the database periodically or ocasionally, and that the data management and retrieval
happens only at the servers. Clients submit queries about the owner’s data to the servers and get
back results through the network.
It is much cheaper to maintain ordinary servers than to maintain truly secure ones, particularly
in the distributed setting. To guard against malicious/compromised servers, the owner must give
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the clients the ability to authenticate the answers they receive without having to trust the servers.
In that respect, query authentication has three important dimensions: correctness, completeness
and freshness. Correctness means that the client must be able to validate that the returned records
do exist in the owner’s database and have not been modified in any way. Completeness means
that no answers have been omitted from the result. Finally, freshness means that the results are
based on the most current version of the database, that incorporates the latest owner updates. It
should be stressed here that query freshness is an important dimension of query authentication
that has not been extensively explored in the past, since it is a requirement arising from updates
to the ODB systems, an aspect that has not been sufficiently studied yet.
There are a number of important costs pertaining to the aforementioned model, relating to
the construction, query, and update phases. In particular, in this work the following metrics are
considered: 1. The computation overhead for the owner, 2. The owner-server communication
cost, 3. The storage overhead for the server, 4. The computation overhead for the server, 5. The
client-server communication cost, and 6. The computation cost for the client (for verification).
Previous work has addressed the problem of query authentication mostly for static scenarios,
where owners never issue data updates. In addition, existing solutions take into account only
a subset of the metrics proposed here, and hence are optimized only for particular scenarios
and not the general case. Finally, previous work was mostly of theoretical nature, analyzing
the performance of the proposed techniques using analytical cost formulas, and not taking into
account the fact that certain cryptographic primitives do not feature idealistic characteristics
in practice. For example, trying to minimize the I/O cost associated with the construction of
an authenticated structure does not take into account the fact that generating signatures using
popular public signature schemes is two times slower than a random disk page access on today’s
computers. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work ever conducted empirical evaluations
on a working prototype of existing techniques.
Our Contributions. In this work, we: 1. Conduct a methodical analysis of existing approaches
over all six metrics, 2. Propose a novel authenticated structure that best leverages all metrics,
3. Formulate detailed cost models for all techniques that take into account not only the usual
structural maintenance overheads, but the cost of cryptographic operations as well, 4. Discuss
the extensions of the proposed techniques for dynamic environments (where data is frequently
updated), 5. Consider possible solutions for guaranteeing query freshness, 6. Implement a fully
working prototype and perform a comprehensive experimental evaluation and comparison of all
alternatives.
We would like to point out that there are other security issues in ODB systems that are
orthogonal to the problems considered here. Examples include: privacy-preservation issues [14, 1,
10], secure query execution [12], security in conjunction with access control requirements [20, 29, 5]
and query execution assurance [30]. In particular, query execution assurance of [30] does not
provide authentication: the server could pass the challenges and yet still return false query results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background on essential
cryptography tools, and a brief review of related work. Section 3 discusses the authenticated
index structures for static ODB scenarios. Section 4 extends the discussion to the dynamic case
and Section 5 addresses query freshness. Finally, the empirical evaluation is presented in Section
6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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r1 r2 r3 r4
h12=H(h1|h2) h34=H(h3|h4)
hroot=H(h12|h34)
h1=H(r1) h2=H(r2)h3=H(r3) h4=H(r4)
stree=S(hroot)
Figure 1: Example of a Merkle hash tree.
2 Preliminaries
The basic idea of the existing solutions to the query authentication problem is the following. The
owner creates a specialized data structure over the original database that is stored at the servers
together with the database. The structure is used by a server to provide a verification object VO
along with the answers, which the client can use for authenticating the results. Verification usually
occurs by means of using collision-resistant hash functions and digital signature schemes. Note
that in any solution, some information that is authentic to the owner must be made available
to the client; else, from the client’s point of view, the owner cannot be differentiated from a
(potentially malicious) server. Examples of such information include the owner’s public signature
verification key or a token that in some way authenticates the database. Any successful scheme
must make it computationally infeasible for a malicious server to find incorrect query results
and verification object that will be accepted by a client who has the appropriate authentication
information from the owner.
2.1 Cryptography essentials
Collision-resistant hash functions. For our purposes, a hash function h is an efficiently
computable function that takes a variable-length input x to a fixed-length output y = h(x).
Collision resistance states that it is computationally infeasible to find two inputs, x1 = x2, such
that h(x1) = h(x2). Collision-resistant hash functions can be built provably based on various
cryptographic assumptions, such as hardness of discrete logarithms [17]. However, in this work
we concentrate on using heuristic hash functions, which have the advantage of being very fast to
evaluate, and specifically focus on SHA1 [24], which takes variable-length inputs to 160-bit (20-
byte) outputs. SHA1 is currently considered collision-resistant in practice; we also note that any
eventual replacement to SHA1 developed by the cryptographic community can be used instead of
SHA1 in our solution.
Public-key digital signature schemes. A public-key digital signature scheme, formally defined
in [11], is a tool for authenticating the integrity and ownership of the signed message. In such
a scheme, the signer generates a pair of keys (SK ,PK ), keeps the secret key SK secret, and
publishes the public key PK associated with her identity. Subsequently, for any message m that
she sends, a signature sm is produced by: sm = S(SK ,m). The recipient of sm and m can verify
sm via V(PK ,m, sm) that outputs “valid” or “invalid.” A valid signature on a message assures
the recipient that the owner of the secret key intended to authenticate the message, and that
the message has not been changed. The most commonly used public digital signature scheme is
RSA [28]. Existing solutions [26, 27, 21, 23] for the query authentication problem chose to use this
scheme, hence we adopt the common 1024-bit (128-byte) RSA. Its signing and verification cost is
one hash computation and one modular exponentiation with 1024-bit modulus and exponent.
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Aggregating several signatures. In the case when t signatures s1, . . . , st on t messages
m1, . . . ,mt signed by the same signer need to be verified all at once, certain signature schemes
allow for more efficient communication and verification than t individual signatures. Namely, for
RSA it is possible to combine the t signatures into a single aggregated signature s1,t that has the
same size as an individual signature and that can be verified (almost) as fast as an individual
signature. This technique is called Condensed-RSA [22]. The combining operation can be done by
anyone, as it does not require knowledge of SK ; moreover, the security of the combined signature
is the same as the security of individual signatures. In particular, aggregation of t RSA signatures
can be done at the cost of t− 1 modular multiplications, and verification can be performed at the
cost of t−1 multiplications, t hashing operations, and one modular exponentiation (thus, the com-
putational gain is that t − 1 modular exponentiations are replaced by modular multiplications).
Note that aggregating signatures is possible only for some digital signature schemes.
The Merkle Hash Tree. An improvement on the straightforward solution for authenticating
a set of data values is the Merkle hash tree (see Figure 1), first proposed by [18]. It solves the
simplest form of the query authentication problem for point queries and datasets that can fit in
main memory. The Merkle hash tree is a binary tree, where each leaf contains the hash of a
data value, and each internal node contains the hash of the concatenation of its two children.
Verification of data values is based on the fact that the hash value of the root of the tree is
authentically published (authenticity can be established by a digital signature). To prove the
authenticity of any data value, all the prover has to do is to provide the verifier, in addition to the
data value itself, with the values stored in the siblings of the path that leads from the root of the
tree to that value. The verifier, by iteratively computing all the appropriate hashes up the tree,
at the end can simply check if the hash she has computed for the root matches the authentically
published value. The security of the Merkle hash tree is based on the collision-resistance of the
hash function used: it is computationally infeasible for a malicous prover to fake a data value,
since this would require finding a hash collision somewhere in the tree (because the root remains
the same and the leaf is different—hence, there must be a collision somewhere in between). Thus,
the authenticity of any one of n data values can be proven at the cost of providing and computing
log2 n hash values, which is generally much cheaper than storing and verifying one digital signature
per data value. Furthermore, the relative position (leaf number) of any of the data values within
the tree is authenticated along with the value itself.
Cost models for SHA1, RSA and Condensed-RSA. Since all existing authenticated struc-
tures are based on SHA1 and RSA, it is imperative to evaluate the relative cost of these operations
in order to be able to draw conclusions about which is the best alternative in practice. Based
on experiments with two widely used cryptography libraries, Crypto++ [7] and OpenSSL [25],
we obtained results for hashing, signing, verifying and performing modulo multiplications. Evi-
dently, one hashing operation on our testbed computer takes approximately 2 to 3 µs. Modular
multiplication, signing and verifying are, respectively, approximately 100, 10,000 and 1,000 times
slower than hashing (verification is faster than signing due to the fact that the public verification
exponent can be fixed to a small value).
Thus, it is clear that multiplication, signing and verification operations are very expensive,
and comparable to random disk page accesses. The cost of these operations needs to be taken into
account in practice, for the proper design of authenticated structures. In addition, since the cost
of hashing is orders of magnitude smaller than that of singing, it is essential to design structures
that use as few signing operations as possible, and hashing instead.
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Table 1: Notation used.
Symbol Description
r A database record
k A B+-tree key
p A B+-tree pointer
h A hash value
s A signature
|x| Size of object x
ND Total number of database records
NR Total number of query results
P Page size
fx Node fanout of structure x
dx Height of structure x
Hl(x) A hash operation on input x of length l
Sl(x) A signing operation on input x of length l
Vl(x) A verifying operation on input x of length l
Cx Cost of operation x
VO The verification object
2.2 Previous work
There are several notable works that are related to our problem. A good survey is provided in [23];
our review here is brief. The first set of attempts to address query authentication problems in
ODB systems appeared in [9, 8, 16]. The focus of these works is on designing solutions for query
correctness only, creating structures that are based on Merkle trees. The work of [16] generalized
the Merkle hash tree ideas to work with any DAG (directed acyclic graph) structure. With
similar techniques, the work of [3] uses the Merkle tree to authenticate XML documents in the
ODB model. The work of [27] further extended the idea and introduced the VB-tree which was
suitable for structures stored on secondary storage. However, this approach is expensive and was
later subsumed by [26]. Several proposals for signature-based approaches addressing both query
correctness and completeness appear in [23, 21, 26]. We are not aware of work that specifically
addresses the query freshness issue.
Hardware support for secure data access is investigated in [5, 4]. It offers a promising research
direction for designing query authentication scheme with special hardware support if it is available.
Lastly, distributed content authentication has been addressed in [31], where distributed version
of Merkle hash tree is applied.
3 The Static Case
In this section we illustrate three approaches for query correctness and completeness: a signature-
based approach similar to the ones described in [26, 23], a Merkle-tree-like approach based on
the ideas presented in [16], and our novel embedded tree approach. We present them for the
static scenario where no data updates occur between the owner and the servers on the outsourced
database. We also present analytical cost models for all techniques, given a variety of performance
metrics. As already mentioned, detailed analytical modeling was not considered in related liter-
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r1 r2 r3 rn rx
B+-tree
S(r1|r2) S(r2|r3) S(r3|r4) S(rn|rx)
Figure 2: The signature-based approach.
ature and is an important contribution of this work. It gives the ability to the owners to decide
which structure best satisfies their needs, using a variety of performance measures.
In the following, we derive models for the storage, construction, query, and authentication
cost of each technique, taking into account the overhead of hashing, signing, verifying data, and
performing expensive computations (like modular multiplications of large numbers). The analysis
considers range queries on a specific database attribute A indexed by a B+-tree [6]. The size of
the structure is important first for quantifying the storage overhead on the servers, and second
for possibly quantifying the owner/server communication cost. The construction cost is useful
for quantifying the overhead incurred by the database owner for outsourcing the data. The
query cost quantifies the incurred server cost for answering client queries, and hence the potential
query throughput. The authentication cost quantifies the server/client communication cost and,
in addition, the client side incurred cost for verifying the query results. The notation used is
summarized in Table 1. In the rest, for ease of exposition, it is assumed that all structures are
bulk-loaded in a bottom-up fashion and that all index nodes are completely full. In addition, all
divisions are assumed to have residual zero. Our results can easily be extended to the general
case.
3.1 Aggregated Signatures with B+-trees
The first authenticated data structure for static environments is a direct extension of aggregated
signatures and ideas that appeared in [23, 26]. To guarantee correctness and completeness the
following technique can be used: First, the owner individually hashes and signs all consecutive
pairs of tuples in the database, assuming some sorted order on a given attribute A. For example,
given two consecutive tuples ri, rj the owner transmits to the servers the pair (ri, si), where
si = S(ri|rj) (‘|’ denotes some canonical pairing of strings that can be uniquely parsed back into
its two components; e.g., simple string concatenation if the lengths are fixed). The first and last
tuples can be paired with special marker records. Chaining tuples in this way will enable the
clients to verify that no in-between tuples have been dropped from the results or modified in any
way. An example of this scheme is shown in Figure 2.
In order to speed up query execution on the server side a B+-tree is constructed on top of
attribute A. To answer a query the server constructs a VO that contains one pair rq|sq per
query result. In addition, one tuple to the left of the lower-bound of the query results and one to
the right of the upper-bound is returned, in order for the client to be able to guarantee that no
boundary results have been dropped. Notice that since our completeness requirements are less
stringent than those of [26] (where they assume that database access permissions restrict which
tuples the database can expose to the user), for fairness we have simplified the query algorithm
substantially here.
There are two obvious and serious drawbacks associated with this approach. First, the ex-
tremely large VO size that contains a linear number of signatures w.r.t. NR, taking into account
that signatures sizes are very large. Second, the high verification cost for the clients. Authen-
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tication requires NR verification operations which, as mentioned earlier, are very expensive. To
solve this problem one can use the aggregated signature scheme discussed in Section 2.1. Instead
of sending one signature per query result the server can send one combined signature sπ for all
results, and the client can use an aggregate verification instead of individual verifications.
By using aggregated RSA signatures, the client can authenticate the results by hashing consec-
utive pairs of tuples in the result-set, and calculating the product mπ =
∏
∀q hq (mod n) (where
n is the RSA modulus from the public key of the owner). It is important to notice that both sπ
and mπ require a linear number of modular multiplications (w.r.t. NR). The cost models of the
aggregated signature scheme for the metrics considered are as follows:
Node fanout: The node fanout of the B+-tree structure is:
fa =
P − |p|
|k|+ |p| + 1 . (1)
Storage cost: The total size of the authenticated structure (excluding the database itself) is
equal to the size of the B+-tree plus the size of the signatures. For a total of ND tuples the height
of the tree is equal to da = logfa ND, consisting of NI =
fdaa −1
fa−1 (=
∑da−1
i=0 f
i
a) nodes in total.
Hence:
Cas = P ·
fdaa − 1
fa − 1 +ND · |s|. (2)
The storage cost also reflects the initial communication cost between the owner and servers.
Notice that the owner does not have to upload the B+-tree to the servers, since the latter can
rebuild it by themselves, which will reduce the owner/server communication cost but increase
the computation cost at the servers. Nevertheless, the cost of sending the signatures cannot be
avoided.
Construction cost: The cost incurred by the owner for constructing the structure has three
components: the signature computation cost, bulk-loading the B+-tree, and the I/O cost for
storing the structure. Since the signing operation is very expensive, it dominates the overall cost.
Bulk-loading the B+-tree in main memory is much less expensive and its cost can be omitted.
Hence:
Cac = ND · (CH|r| + CS2|h|) +
Cas
P
· CIO. (3)
VO construction cost: The cost of constructing the VO for a range query depends on the
total disk I/O for traversing the B+-tree and retrieving all necessary record/signature pairs, as
well as on the computation cost of sπ. Assuming that the total number of leaf pages accessed is
NQ = NRfa , the VO construction cost is:
Caq = (NQ + da − 1 +
NR · |r|
P
+
NR · |s|
P
) · CIO + Csπ , (4)
where the last term is the modular multiplication cost for computing the aggregated signature,
which is linear to NR. The I/O overhead for retrieving the signatures is also large.
Authentication cost: The size of the VO is equal to the result-set size plus the size of one
signature:
|VO|a = NR · |r|+ |s|. (5)
The cost of verifying the query results is dominated by the hash function computations and
modular multiplications at the client:
Cav = NR · CH|r| + Cmπ + CV|n| , (6)
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kj pj
piki
hj=H(h1|...|hf )
hi=H(ri)
Figure 3: An MB-tree node.
where the modular multiplication cost for computing the aggregated hash value is linear to the
result-set size NR, and the size of the final product has length in the order of |n| (the RSA
modulus). The final term is the cost of verifying the product using sπ and the owner’s public key.
It becomes obvious now that one advantage of the aggregated signature scheme is that it
features small VO sizes and hence small client/server communication cost. On the other hand
it has the following serious drawbacks: 1. Large storage overhead on the servers, dominated by
the large signature sizes, 2. Large communication overhead between the owners and the servers
that cannot be reduced, 3. A very high initial construction cost, dominated by the cost of com-
puting the signatures, 4. Added I/O cost for retrieving signatures, linear to NR, 5. An added
modular multiplication cost, linear to the result-set size, for constructing the VO and authenti-
cating the results. Our experimental evaluation shows that this cost is significant compared to
other operations, 6. The requirement for a public key signature scheme that supports aggregated
signatures. For the rest of the paper, this approach is denoted as Aggregated Signatures with
B+-trees (ASB-tree).
3.2 The Merkle B-tree
Motivated by the drawbacks of the ASB-tree, we present a different approach for building authen-
ticated structures that is based on the general ideas of [16] (which utilize the Merkle hash tree)
applied in our case on a B+-tree structure. We term this structure the Merkle B-tree (MB-tree).
As already explained in Section 2.1, the Merkle hash tree uses a hierarchical hashing scheme in
the form of a binary tree to achieve query authentication. Clearly, one can use a similar hashing
scheme with trees of higher fanout and with different organization algorithms, like the B+-tree,
to achieve the same goal. An MB-tree works like a B+-tree and also consists of ordinary B+-tree
nodes that are extended with one hash value associated with every pointer entry. The hash values
associated with entries on leaf nodes are computed on the database records themselves. The
hash values associated with index node entries are computed on the concatenation of the hash
values of their children. For example, an MB-tree is illustrated in Figure 3. A leaf node entry
is associated with a hash value h = H(ri), while an index node entry with h = H(h1| · · · |hfm),
where h1, . . . , hfm are the hash values of the node’s children, assuming fanout fm per node. After
computing all hash values, the owner has to sign the hash of the root using the private key.
To answer a range query the server builds a VO by initiating two top-down B+-tree like
traversals, one to find the left-most and one the right-most query result. At the leaf level, the
data contained in the nodes between the two discovered boundary leaves are returned, as in
the normal B+-tree. The server also needs to include in the VO the hash values of the entries
contained in each index node that is visited by the lower and upper boundary traversals of the tree,
except the hashes to the right (left) of the pointers that are traversed during the lower (upper)
boundary traversals. At the leaf level, the server inserts only the answers to the query, along with
the hash values of the residual entries to the left and to the right parts of the boundary leaves.
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L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
L7 L8 L9
return hi
return hi
I7 I8
return ri
ρ1
ρo
L10 L11 L12
Figure 4: A query traversal on an MB-tree. At every level the hashes of the residual entries on
the left and right boundary nodes need to be returned.
The result is also increased with one tuple to the left and one to the right of the lower-bound and
upper-bound of the query result respectively, for completeness verification. Finally, the signed
root of the tree is inserted as well. An example query traversal is shown in Figure 4.
The client can iteratively compute all the hashes of the sub-tree corresponding to the query
result, all the way up to the root using the VO. The hashes of the query results are computed first
and grouped into their corresponding leaf nodes1, and the process continues iteratively, until all
the hashes of the query sub-tree have been computed. After the hash value of the root has been
computed, the client can verify the correctness of the computation using the owner’s public key
and the signed hash of the root. It is easy to see that since the client is forced to recompute the
whole query sub-tree, both correctness and completeness is guaranteed. It is interesting to note
here that one could avoid building the whole query sub-tree during verification by individually
signing all database tuples as well as each node of the B+-tree. This approach, called VB-tree,
was proposed in [27] but it is subsumed by the signature based approach. The analytical cost
models of the MB-tree are as follows:
Node fanout: The node fanout in this case is:
fm =
P − |p| − |h|
|k|+ |p|+ |h| + 1. (7)
Notice that the maximum node fanout of the MB-trees is considerably smaller than that of the
ASB-tree, since the nodes here are extended with one hash value per entry. This adversely affects
the total height of the MB-tree.
Storage cost: The total size is equal to:
Cms = P ·
fdmm − 1
fm − 1 + |s|. (8)
An important advantage of the MB-tree is that the storage cost does not necessarily reflect the
owner/server communication cost. The owner, after computing the final signature of the root, does
not have to transmit all hash values to the server, but only the database tuples. The server can
recompute the hash values incrementally by recreating the MB-tree. Since hash computations
are cheap, for a small increase in the server’s computation cost this technique will reduce the
owner/sever communication cost drastically.
Construction cost: The construction cost for building an MB-tree depends on the hash function
computations and the total I/Os. Since the tree is bulk-loaded, building the leaf level requires
ND hash computations of length input |r|. In addition, for every tree node one hash of input
1Extra node boundary information can be inserted in the VO for this purpose with a very small overhead.
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length fm · |h| is computed. Since there are a total of NI = f
dm
m −1
fm−1 nodes on average (given height
dm = logfm ND), the total number of hash function computations, and hence the total cost for
constructing the tree is given by:
Cmc = ND · CH|r| +NI · CHfm|h| + CS|h| +
Cms
P
· CIO. (9)
VO construction cost: The VO construction cost is dominated by the total disk I/O. Let the
total number of leaf pages accessed be equal to NQ = NRfm , dm = logfm ND and dq = logfm NR
be the height of the MB-tree and the query sub-tree respectively. In the general case the index
traversal cost is:
Cmq = [(dm − dq + 1) + 2(dq − 2) +NQ +
NR · |r|
P
] · CIO, (10)
taking into account the fact that the query traversal at some point splits into two paths. It is
assumed here that the query range spans at least two leaf nodes. The first term corresponds to
the hashes inserted for the common path of the two traversal from the root of the tree to the root
of the query sub-tree. The second term corresponds to the two traversals after they split. The
last two terms correspond to the leaf level of the tree and the database records.
Authentication cost: Assuming that ρ0 is the total number of query results contained in the
left boundary leaf node of the query sub-tree, σ0 on the right boundary leaf node, and ρi, σi the
total number of entries of the left and right boundary nodes on level i, 1 ≤ i ≤ dq, that point
towards leaves that contain query results (see Figure 4), the size of the VO is:
|VO|m =
(2fm − ρ0 − σ0)|h| +NR · |r|+ |s|+
(dm − dq) · (fm − 1)|h| +
dq−2∑
i=1
(2fm − ρi − σi)|h|+
(fm − ρdq−1 − σdq−1)|h|. (11)
This cost does not include the extra boundary information needed by the client in order to group
hashes correctly, but this overhead is very small (one byte per node in the VO) especially when
compared with the hash value size. Consequently, the verification cost on the client is:
Cmv = NR · CH|r| +
dq−1∑
i=0
f im · CHfm|h| +
(dm − dq) · CHfm|h| + CV|h| . (12)
Given that the computation cost of hashing versus signing is orders of magnitude smaller, the
initial construction cost of the MB-tree is expected to be orders of magnitude less expensive than
that of the ASB-tree. Given that the size of hash values is much smaller than that of signatures and
that the fanout of the MB-tree will be smaller than that of the ASB-tree, it is not easy to quantify
the exact difference in the storage cost of these techniques, but it is expected that the structures
will have comparable storage cost, with the MB-tree being smaller. The VO construction cost of
the MB-tree will be much smaller than that of the ASB-tree, since the ASB-tree requires many
I/Os for retrieving signatures, and also some expensive modular multiplications. The MB-tree
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Index Node
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(b) An instance of EMB-tree node with
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Figure 5: EMB-tree.
will have smaller verification cost as well since: 1. hashing operations are orders of magnitude
cheaper than modular multiplications; 2. The ASB-tree requires NR modular multiplications
for verification. The only drawback of the MB-tree is the large VO size, which increases the
client/server communication cost. Notice that the VO size of the MB-tree is bounded by fm ·
logfm ND. Since generally fm  logfm ND, the VO size is essentially determined by fm, resulting
in large sizes.
3.3 The Embedded Merkle B-tree
In this section we propose a novel data structure, the Embedded Merkle B-tree (EMB-tree), that
provides a nice, adjustable trade-off between robust initial construction and storage cost versus
improved VO construction and verification cost. The main idea is to have different fanouts for
storage and authentication and yet combine them in the same data structure.
Every EMB-tree node consists of regular B+-tree entries, augmented with an embedded MB-
tree. Let fe be the fanout of the EMB-tree. Then each node stores up to fe triplets ki|pi|hi, and
an embedded MB-tree with fanout fk < fe. The leaf level of this embedded tree consists of the
fe entries of the node. The hash value at the root level of this embedded tree is stored as an hi
value in the parent of the node, thus authenticating this node to its parent. Essentially, we are
collapsing an MB-tree with height de ·dk = logfk ND into a tree with height de that stores smaller
MB-trees of height dk within each node. Here, de = logfe ND is the height of the EMB-tree
and dk = logfk fe is the height of each small embedded MB-tree. An example EMB-tree node is
shown in Figure 5(a). Another instance of EMB-tree for an index node with six entries is shown
in Figure 5(b).
For ease of exposition, in the rest of this discussion it will be assumed that fe is a power of
fk such that the embedded trees when bulk-loaded are always full. The technical details if this
is not the case can be worked out easily. The exact relation between fe and fk will be discussed
shortly. After choosing fk and fe, bulk-loading the EMB-tree is straightforward: Simply group
the ND tuples in groups of size fe to form the leaves and build their embedded trees on the fly.
Continue iteratively in a bottom up fashion.
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When querying the structure the server follows a path from the root to the leaves of the
external tree as in the normal B+-tree. For every node visited, the algorithm scans all fe − 1
triplets ki|pi|hi on the data level of the embedded tree to find the key that needs to be followed
to the next level. When the right key is found the server also initiates a point query on the
embedded tree of the node using this key. The point query will return all the needed hash values
for computing the concatenated hash of the node, exactly like for the MB-tree. Essentially, these
hash values would be the equivalent of the fe− 1 sibling hashes that would be returned per node
if the embedded tree was not used. However, since now the hashes are arranged hierarchically in
an fk-way tree, the total number of values inserted in the VO per node is reduced to (fk − 1)dk.
To authenticate the query results the client uses the normal MB-tree authentication algorithm
to construct the hash value of the root node of each embedded tree (assuming that proper bound-
ary information has been included in the VO for separating groups of hash values into different
nodes) and then follows the same algorithm once more for computing the final hash value of the
root of the EMB-tree.
The EMB-tree structure uses extra space for storing the index levels of the embedded trees.
Hence, by construction it has increased height compared with the MB-tree due to smaller fanout
fe. A first, simple, optimization for improving the fanout of the EMB-tree is to avoid storing the
embedded trees altogether. Instead, each embedded tree can be instantiated by computing fewer
than fe/(fk − 1) hashes on the fly, only when a node is accessed during the querying phase. We
call this the EMB−-tree. The EMB−-tree is logically the same as the EMB-tree, however its
physical structure is equivalent to an MB-tree with the hash values computed differently. With
this optimization the storage overhead is minimized and the height of the EMB−-tree becomes
equal to the height of the equivalent MB-tree. The trade-off is an increased computation cost for
constructing the VO. However, this cost is minimal as the number of embedded trees that need
to be reconstructed is bounded by the height of the EMB−-tree.
As a second optimization, one can create a slightly more complicated embedded tree to reduce
the total size of the index levels and increase fanout fe. We call this the EMB∗-tree. Essentially,
instead of using a B+-tree as the base structure for the embedded trees, one can use a multi-
way search tree with fanout fk while keeping the structure of the external EMB-tree intact. A
multi-way search tree allows data values to be stored in index levels, thus possibly reducing the
length of the search path for a given data value. The embedded tree based on B+-tree has a total
of Ni =
f
dk
k −1
fk−1 nodes while, for example, a B-tree based embedded tree (recall that a B-tree is
equivalent to a balanced multi-way search tree) would contain Ni = fe−1fk−1 nodes instead. A side
effect of using multi-way search trees is that the cost for querying the embedded tree on average
will decreases, since the search for a particular key might stop before reaching the leaf level. This
will reduce the expected cost of VO construction substantially. An EMB∗-tree node is shown in
figure 6.
Below we give the analytical cost models of the EMB-tree. The cost models for the EMB∗-tree
and EMB−-tree are similar.
Node fanout: For the EMB-tree, the relationship between fe and fk is given by:
P ≥
f
logfk
fe−1
k − 1
fk − 1 [fk(|k|+ |p|+ |h|) − |k|] +
[fe(|k|+ |p|+ |h|)− |k|]. (13)
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Figure 6: An EMB∗-tree node.
First, a suitable fk is chosen such that the requirements for authentication cost and storage
overhead are met. Then, the maximum value for fe satisfying (13) can be determined.
Storage cost: The storage cost is equal to:
Ces = P ·
fdee − 1
fe − 1 + |s|. (14)
Construction cost: The total construction cost is the cost of constructing all the embedded
trees plus the I/Os to write the tree back to disk. Given a total of NI = f
de
e −1
fe−1 nodes in the tree
and Ni =
f
dk
k −1
fk−1 nodes per embedded tree, the cost is:
Cec = ND · CH|r| +NI ·Ni · CHfk|h| + CS|h| +
Ces
P
· CIO. (15)
It should be mentioned here that the cost for constructing the EMB−-tree is exactly the same,
since in order to find the hash values for the index entries of the trees one needs to instantiate all
embedded trees. The cost of the EMB∗-tree is somewhat smaller than (15), due to the smaller
number of nodes in the embedded trees.
VO construction cost: The VO construction cost is dominated by the total I/O for locating
and reading all the nodes containing the query results. Similarly to the MB-tree case:
Ceq = [(de − dq + 1) + 2(dq − 2) +NQ +
NR · |r|
P
] · CIO, (16)
where dq is the height of the query sub-tree and NQ = NRfe is the number of leaf pages to be
accessed. Since the embedded trees are loaded with each node, the querying computation cost
associated with finding the needed hash values is expected to be dominated by the cost of loading
the node in memory, and hence it is omitted. It should be restated here that for the EMB∗-tree
the expected VO construction cost will be smaller, since not all embedded tree searches will reach
the leaf level of the structure.
Authentication cost: The embedded trees work exactly like MB-trees for point queries. Hence,
each embedded tree returns (fk − 1)dk hashes. Similarly with the MB-tree the total size of the
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VO is:
|VO|e = NR · |r|+ |s|+
dq−2∑
0
2|VO|m + |VO|m +
dm−1∑
dq
(fk − 1)dk|h|, (17)
where |VO|m is the cost of a range query on the embedded trees of the boundary nodes contained
in the query sub-tree given by equation (11), with query range that covers all pointers to children
that cover the query result-set.
The verification cost is:
Cev = NR · CH|r| +
dq−1∑
i=0
f ie · Ck + (de − dq) · Ck + CV|h| , (18)
where Ck = Ni · CHfk|h| is the cost for constructing the concatenated hash of each node using the
embedded tree.
For fk = 2 the authentication cost becomes equal to a Merkle hash tree, which has the
minimal VO size but higher verification time. For fk ≥ fe the embedded tree consists of only
one node which can actually be discarded, hence the authentication cost becomes equal to that
of an MB-tree, which has larger VO size but smaller verification cost. Notice that, as fk becomes
smaller, fe becomes smaller as well. This has an impact on VO construction cost and size, since
with smaller fanout the height of the EMB-tree increases. Nevertheless, since there is only a
logarithmic dependence on fe versus a linear dependence on fk, it is expected that with smaller
fk the authentication related operations will become faster.
3.4 General Query Types
The proposed authenticated structures can support other query types as well. Due to lack of
space we briefly discuss here a possible extension of these techniques for join queries. Other query
types that can be supported are projections and multi-attribute queries.
Assume that we would like to provide authenticated results for join queries such as R Ai=Aj
S, where Ai ∈ R and Aj ∈ S (R and S could be relations or result-sets from other queries), and
authenticated structures for both Ai in R and Aj in S exist. The server can provide the proof
for the join as follows: 1. Select the relation with the smaller size, say R, 2. Construct the V O
for R (if R is an entire relation then VO contains only the signature of the root node from the
index of R), 3. Construct the VOs for each of the following selection queries: for each record rk
in R, qk =“select from S where r.Aj = rk.Ai”. The client can easily verify the join results. First,
it authenticates that the relation R is complete and correct. Then, using the VO for each query
qk, it makes sure that it is complete for every k (even when the result of qk is empty). After
this verification, the client can construct the results for the join query and be sure that they are
complete and correct.
4 The Dynamic Case
Surprisingly, previous work has not dealt with dynamic scenarios where data gets updated at
regular time intervals. In this section we analyze the performance of all approaches given dynamic
updates between the owner and the servers. In particular we assume that either insertions or
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deletions can occur to the database, for simplicity. The performance of updates in the worst case
can be considered as the cost of a deletion followed by an insertion. There are two contributing
factors for the update cost: computation cost such as creating new signatures and computing
hashes, and I/O cost.
4.1 Aggregated Signatures with B+ Tree
Suppose that a single database record ri is inserted in or deleted from the database. Assuming
that in the sorted order of attribute A the left neighbor of ri is ri−1 and the right neighbor is ri+1,
for an insertion the owner has to compute signatures S(ri−1)|ri) and S(ri|ri+1), and for a deletion
S(ri−1|ri+1). For k consecutive updates in the best case a total of k+2 signature computations are
required for insertions and 1 for deletions if the deleted tuples are consecutive. In the worst case
a total of 2k signature computations are needed for insertions and k for deletions, if no two tuples
are consecutive. Given k updates, suppose the expected number of signatures to be computed is
represented by E{k}. Then the additional I/O incurred is equal to E{k}·|s|P , excluding the I/Os
incurred for updating the B+-tree structure. Since the cost of signature computations is larger
than even the I/O cost of random disk accesses, a large number of updates is expected to have a
very expensive updating cost. The experimental evaluation verifies this claim. The total update
cost for the ASB-tree is:
Cau = E{k} · Cs +
E{k} · |s|
P
· CIO. (19)
4.2 The Merkle B-tree
The MB-tree can support efficient updates since only hash values are stored for the records in the
tree and, first, hashing is orders of magnitude faster then signing, second, for each tuple only the
path from the affected leaf to the root need to be updated. Hence, the cost of updating a single
record is dominated by the cost of I/Os. Assuming that no reorganization to the tree occurs the
cost of an insertion is Cmu = H|r| + dm(Hfm|h| + CIO) + S|h|.
In realistic scenarios though one expects that a large number of updates will occur at the same
time. In other cases the owner may decide to do a delayed batch processing of updates as soon as
enough changes to the database have occurred. The naive approach for handling batch updates
would be to do all updates to the MB-tree one by one and update the path from the leaves to
the root once per update. Nevertheless, in case that a large number of updates affect a similar
set of nodes (e.g., the same leaf) a per tuple updating policy performs an unnecessary number
of hash function computations on the predecessor path. In such cases, the computation cost can
be reduced significantly by recomputing the hashes of all affected nodes only once, after all the
updates have been performed on the tree. A similar analysis holds for the incurred I/O as well.
Clearly, the total update cost for the per tuple update approach for k insertions is k · Cmu
which is linear to the number of affected nodes k ·dm. The expected cost of k updates using batch
processing can be computed as follows. Given k updates to the MB-tree, assuming that all tuples
are updated uniformly at random and using a standard balls and bins argument, the probability
that leaf node X has been affected at least once is P (X) = 1 − (1 − 1
fdm−1m
)k and the expected
number of leaf nodes that have been affected is fdm−1m · P (X). Using the same argument, the
expected number of nodes at level i (where i = 1 is the leaf level and 1 ≤ i ≤ dm) is fdm−im ·Pi(X),
where Pi(X) = [1− (1− 1
fdm−im
)k]. Hence, for a batch of k updates the total expected number of
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nodes that will be affected is:
E{X} =
dm−1∑
i=0
f im[1− (1−
1
f im
)k]. (20)
Hence, the expected MB-tree update cost for batch updates is
Cmu = k · H|r| + E{X} · (Hfm|h| + CIO) + S|h|. (21)
In order to understand better the relationship between the per-update approach and the
batch-update, we can find the closed form for E{X} as follows:
∑dm−1
i=0 f
i
m(1− (f
i
m−1
f im
)k)
=
∑dm−1
i=0 f
i
m(1− (1− 1f im )
k)
=
∑dm−1
i=0 f
i
m[1−
∑k
x=0
(
k
x
)
(− 1
f im
)x]
=
∑dm−1
i=0 f
i
m −
∑dm−1
i=0
∑k
x=0
(
k
x
)
(−1)x( 1
f im
)x−1
= kdm −
∑k
x=2
(
k
x
)
(−1)x∑dm−1i=0 ( 1f im )
x−1
= kdm −
∑k
x=2
(
k
x
)
(−1)x
1−( 1
f
dm
m
)x−1
1−( 1
fm
)x−1
The second term quantifies the cost decrease afforded by the batch update operation, when
compared to the per update cost.
For non-uniform updates to the database, the batch updating technique is expected to work
well in practice given that in real settings updates exhibit a certain degree of locality. In such
cases one can still derive a similar cost analysis by modeling the distribution of updates.
4.3 The Embedded MB-tree
The analysis for the EMB-tree is similar to the one for MB-trees. The update cost for per tuple
updates is equal to k · Ceu, where Ceu = H|r|+ de logfk fe · (Hfk |h|+CIO)+S|h|, once again assuming
that no reorganizations to the tree occur. Similarly to the MB-tree case the expected cost for
batch updates is equal to:
Ceu = k · H|r| + E{X} · logfk fe · (Hfk |h| + CIO) + S|h|. (22)
4.4 Discussion
For the ASB-tree, the communication cost for updates between owner and servers is bounded
by E{K}|s|, and there is no possible way to reduce this cost as only the owner can compute
signatures. However, for the hash based index structures, there are a number of options that can
be used for transmitting the updates to the server. The first option is for the owner to transmit
only a delta table with the updated nodes of the MB-tree (or EMB-tree) plus the signed root. The
second option is to transmit only the signed root and the updates themselves and let the servers
redo the necessary computations on the tree. The first approach minimizes the computation cost
on the servers but increases the communication cost, while the second approach has the opposite
effect.
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5 Query Freshness
The dynamic scenario reveals a third dimension of the query authentication problem that has
not been sufficiently explored in previous work: namely, query result freshness. When the owner
updates the database, a malicious or compromised server may still retain an older version. Because
the old version was authenticated by the owner, the client will still accept it as authentic, unless
it receives some extra information to indicate that this is no longer the case. In fact, a malicious
server may choose any of the previous versions, and in some scenarios even a combination of them.
If the client wishes to be sure that the version is not only authentic, but is also the most recent
version available, some additional work is necessary.
This issue is similar to the problem of ensuring the freshness of signed documents, which
has been studied extensively, particularly in the context of certificate validation and revocation.
There are many solutions which we do not review here. The simplest is to publish a list of revoked
signatures; more sophisticated ones are: including the time interval of validity as part of the signed
message and reissuing the signature after the interval expires, and using hash chains to confirm
validity of signatures at frequent intervals [19].
The advantage of all Merkle tree based solutions presented here is that any of these approaches
can be applied directly to the single signature of the root of the tree, because this signature alone
authenticates the whole database. Thus, whatever solution to the signature freshness problem
one uses, it needs to be used only for one signature and freshness will be assured. Each update
will require re-issuing one signature only.
This is in contrast to the ASB-tree approach, which uses multiple signatures. It is unclear
how to solve the freshness problem for the ASB-tree without applying the freshness techniques to
each signature individually, which will be prohibitively expensive because of the sheer number of
signatures.
6 Experimental Evaluation
For our experimental evaluation we have implemented the aggregated signatures technique using
a B+-tree (ASB-tree), the MB-tree, the EMB-tree and its two variants, EMB−-tree and EMB∗-
tree. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first that performs simulations on a working
prototype. Previous work has used only analytical techniques that did not take into account
important parameters. A well designed experimental evaluation can reveal many interesting issues
that are hidden when only theoretical aspects are considered. In addition, empirical evaluations
help verify the correctness of the developed cost models. The prototype can be downloaded from
[2].
6.1 Setup
We use a synthetic database that consists of one table with 100, 000 tuples. Each tuple contains
multiple attributes, a primary key A, and is 500 bytes long. For simplicity, we assume that an
authenticated index is build on A, with page size equal to 1 KByte. All experiments are performed
on a Linux machine with a 2.8GHz Intel Pentium 4 CPU.
The cost CIO of one I/O operation on this machine using 1KByte pages for the indexes is
on average 1 ms for a sequential read and 15 ms for random access. The costs CH of hashing
a message with length 500 bytes is approximately equal to 3 µs. In comparison, the cost CS of
signing a message with any length is approximately equal to 34 ms. The cost of one modular
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Figure 7: Index parameters.
multiplication with 128 byte modulus is close to 200 µs. To quantify these costs we used the
publicly available Crypto++ [7] and OpenSSL [25] libraries.
6.2 Performance Analysis
We run experiments to evaluate the proposed solutions under all metrics. First, we test the initial
construction cost of each technique. Then, we measure their query and verification performance.
Finally, we run simulations to analyze their performance for dynamic scenarios. For various
embedded index structures, the fanout of their embedded trees is set to 2 by default, except if
otherwise specified.
6.2.1 Construction Cost
First we evaluate the physical characteristics of each structure, namely the maximum and average
fanout, and the height. The results are shown in Figure 7. As expected, the ASB-tree has
the maximum fanout and hence the smallest height, while the opposite is true for the EMB-
tree. However, the maximum height difference, which is an important measure for the number
of additional I/Os per query when using deeper structures, is only 2. Of course this depends on
the database size. In general, the logarithmic relation between the fanout and the database size
limits the difference in height of the different indices.
Next, we measure the construction cost and the total size of each structure, which are useful
indicators for the owner/server computation overhead, communication cost and storage demands.
Figure 8(a) clearly shows the overhead imposed on the ASB-tree by the excessive signature com-
putations. Notice on the enclosed detailed graph that the overhead of other authenticated index
structures in the worst case is twice as large as the cost of building the B+-tree of the ASB-tree
approach. Figure 8(b) captures the total size of each structure. Undoubtedly, the ASB-tree has
the biggest storage overhead. The EMB-tree is storage demanding as well since the addition of
the embedded trees decreases the index fanout substantially. The MB-tree has the least storage
overhead and the EMB∗-tree is a good compromise between the MB-tree and the EMB-tree for
this metric. Notice that the proposed cost models capture very accurately the tree sizes.
The client/server communication cost using the simplest possible strategy is directly related
to the size of the authenticated structures. It should be stressed however that for the hash based
approaches this cost can be reduced significantly by rebuilding the trees at the server side. In
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contrast, the ASB-tree is not equally flexible since all signatures have to be computed at the
owner.
The construction cost of our new authenticated index structures has two components. The
I/O cost for building the trees and the computational cost for computing hash values. Figure 9
shows the total number of hash computations executed per structure, and the total time required.
Evidently, the EMB-tree approaches increase the number of hashes that need to be computed.
However, the additional computation time increases by a small margin as hashing is cheap, espe-
cially when compared with the total construction overhead (see Figure 8). Thus, the dominating
cost factor proves to be the I/O operations of the index.
6.2.2 Query and Verification Cost
In this section we study the performance of the structures for range queries. We generate a number
of synthetic query workloads with range queries of given selectivity. Each workload contains 100
range queries generated uniformly at random over the domain of A. Results reflect the average
case, where the cost associated with accessing the actual records in the database has not been
included. A 100 page LRU buffer is used, unless otherwise specified. In the rest of the experiments
we do not include the cost model analysis not to clutter the graphs.
The results are summarized in Figure 10. There are two contributing cost factors associated
with answering range queries. The first is the total number of I/Os. The second is the computation
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Figure 10: Performance analysis for range queries.
cost for constructing the VO. The number of I/Os can be further divided into query specific I/Os
(i.e., index traversal I/Os for answering the range query) and VO construction related I/Os.
Figure 10(a) shows the query specific I/Os as a function of selectivity. Straightforwardly, the
number of page access is directly related to the fanout of each tree. Notice that the majority of
page access is sequential I/O at the leaf level of the trees. Figure 10(b) shows the additional I/O
needed by each structure for completing the VO. Evidently, the ASB-tree has to perform a very
large number of sequential I/Os for retrieving the signatures of the results. Our authenticated
index structures need to do only a few (upper bounded by the height of the index) extra random
accesses for traversing the path that leads to the upper boundary tuple of the query result. Figure
10(c) shows the total I/O incurred by the structures. It is clear that the ASB-tree has the worst
performance overall, even though its query specific performance is the best.
Figure 10(d) shows the runtime cost of additional computations that need to be performed for
modular multiplications and hashing operations. The ASB-tree has an added multiplication cost
for producing the aggregated signature. This cost is linear to the query result-set size and cannot
be omitted when compared with the I/O cost. This observation is instructive since it shows that
one cannot evaluate analytically or experimentally authenticated structures correctly only by ex-
amining I/O performance. Due to expensive cryptographic computations, I/O operations are not
always a dominating factor. The EMB−-tree has a minor computation overhead, depending only
on the fanout of the conceptual embedded tree. The rest of the structures have no computation
overhead at all.
Interesting conclusions can be drawn by evaluating the effects of the main memory LRU buffer.
Figure 11 shows the total query runtime of all structures with and without the LRU buffer. We
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Figure 11: The effect of the LRU buffer.
can deduce that the LRU buffer reduces the query cost substantially for all techniques. We expect
that when a buffer is available the computation cost is the dominant factor in query runtime, and
the ASB-tree obviously has much worse performance, while without the buffer the I/O cost should
prevail. However, since overall the ASB-tree has the largest I/O cost, the hash based structures
still have better query performance.
Finally, we measure the VO size and verification cost at the client side. The results are shown
in Figure 12. The ASB-tree, as a result of using aggregated signatures always returns just one
signature independent of the query result-set size. The MB-tree has to return about fm logfm ND
number of hashes plus one signature. As fm  logfm ND the fanout is the dominating factor,
and since the MB-tree has a relatively large fanout the VO size is large. The EMB-tree and its
variants, logically work as an MB-tree with fanout fk and hence reduce the VO size significantly
as expected, since fm  fk. Notice that the EMB∗-tree has the smallest VO size among all
embedded index structures, as the searches in its embedded multi-way search trees can stop at
any level of the tree, reducing the number of hashes inserted in the VO.
The verification cost for the ASB-tree is linear to the size of the query result-set due to the
modular multiplication operations, resulting in the worst performance. For the other approaches
the total cost is determined by the total hashes that need to be computed. Interestingly, even
though the MB-tree has the largest VO size, it has the fastest verification time. The reason is
that for verification the number of hash computations is dominated by the height of the index,
and the MB-tree has much smaller height compared to the other structures.
6.2.3 Update Cost
There are two types of update operations, insertions and deletions. To expose the behavior of
each update type, we perform experiments on update workloads that contain either insertions
or deletions. Each update workload contains 100 batch update operations, where each batch
operation consists of a number of insertions or deletions, ranging from a ratio σ = 1% to 50%
of the total database size before the update occurs. Each workload contains batch operations of
equal ratio. We average the results on a per batch update operation basis. Two distributions of
update operations are tested. Ones that are generated uniformly at random, and ones that exhibit
a certain degree of locality. Due to lack of space we present here results only for uniform insertions.
Deletions worked similarly. Skewed distributions exhibit a somewhat improved performance and
have similar effects on all approaches. Finally, results shown here include only the cost of updating
the structures and not the cost associated with updating the database.
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Figure 12: Authentication cost.
Figure 13 summarizes the results for insertion operations. The ASB-tree will require comput-
ing between σND + 1 and 2σND number of signatures. Essentially, every newly inserted tuple
requires two signature computations, unless if two new tuples are consecutive in order in which
case one signature computation can be avoided. Since the update operations are uniformly dis-
tributed, only a few such pairs are expected on average. Figure 13(a) verifies this claim. The other
structures are not included in the graph since they only require one signature re-computation in
all cases.
The total number of pages affected is shown in Figure 13(b). The ASB-tree needs to update
both the pages containing the affected signatures and the B+-tree structure. Clearly, the signature
updates dominate the cost as they are linear to the number of update operations. Other structures
need to update only the nodes of the index. Trees with smaller fanout result in larger number of
affected pages. Even though the EMB−-tree and MB-tree have smaller fanout than the ASB-tree,
they produce much smaller number of affected pages. The EMB-tree and EMB∗-tree produce the
largest number of affected pages. Part of the reason is because in our experiments all indexes
are bulk-loaded with 70% utilization and the update workloads contain only insertions. This will
quickly lead to many split operations, especially for indexes with small fanout, which creates a
lot of new pages.
Another contributing factor to the update cost is the computation overhead. As we can
see from Figure 13(c) the ASB-tree obviously has the worst performance and its cost is order
of magnitudes larger than all other indexes, as it has to perform linear number of signature
computations (w.r.t the number of update operations). For other indexes, the computation cost
is mainly due to the cost of hashing operations and index maintenance. Finally, as Figure 13(d)
shows, the total update cost is simply the page I/O cost plus the computation cost. Our proposed
structures are the clear winners. Finally the communication cost incurred by update operations
is equal to the number of pages affected.
6.2.4 Discussion
The experimental results clearly show that the authenticated structures proposed in this paper
perform better than the state-of-the-art with respect to all metrics except the VO size. Still,
our optimizations reduced the size to four times the size of the VO of the ASB-tree. Overall,
the EMB−-tree gives the best trade-off between all performance metrics, and it should be the
preferred technique in the general case. By adjusting the fanout of the embedded trees, we obtain
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Figure 13: Performance analysis for insertions.
a nice trade-off between query (V O) size, verification time, construction (update) time and storage
overhead.
7 Conclusion
We presented a comprehensive evaluation of authenticated index structures based on a variety
of cost metrics and taking into account the cost of cryptographic operations, as well as that of
index maintenance. We proposed a novel structure that leverages good performance based on all
metrics. We extended the work to dynamic environments, a facet that had not been explored
in the past. We also formulated the problem of query freshness, which is a direct outcome of
the dynamic case. Finally, we presented a comprehensive experimental evaluation to verify our
claims. For future work, we plan to explore other directions for guaranteeing query freshness,
extend our ideas for multidimensional structures, and explore more involved types of queries.
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